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1 Introduction
Social planners hoping to launch high-tech or economy-rescuing projects often find them-
selves in the following predicament. The contenders that are technically capable of carrying
out the project are financially constrained. In the case of high-tech projects such as nuclear
power plants or high-speed rails, the investment necessary to start a project is so large that
it dwarfs the liquid assets of the contenders.1 In the case of economy-rescuing projects such
as the ill-fated toxic asset auction plan of the United States Treasury Department [5], the
contenders are themselves financially constrained. Financially constrained, a contender may
be unable to signal, through bids or initial investments, the social surplus it could produce
should it run the project. Then the social planner would have trouble finding the most capa-
ble contender to run it. To cope with this problem, social planners often offer the contenders
some financial subsidies such as loan or equity guarantees. However, some of such financial
subsidies may give the winner an incentive to default, thereby failing to complete the project
even when the social benefit from completing it outweighs its cost. The question is How to
choose a contender to run the project and, if necessary, how to finance the chosen contender?
Is equity financing better than debt financing? Or are they equivalent?
The above situation may be mapped into a theoretical problem of designing a (socially)
efficient mechanism to select among several contenders a winner to run a project, given that
the contenders are more or less financially constrained. That leads to the agenda of efficient
auction design given budget-constrained bidders. The question is Can efficiency be achieved
if the contenders may finance payments exceeding their liquid assets?2
Che and Gale [2] have developed an auction model where the winner may finance its
bid at a cost. They used the model to study the relationship between budget constraints and
revenues. To be applied to our issue of the possibility of social efficiency, however, the model
needs to incorporate the possibility that a winner defaults. Had there been no default risk,
a firm could have borrowed any amount it needs with a promise to return fully so budget
1 For example, according to a policy brief issued by the Nuclear Energy Institute [4], to set up new
nuclear power plants, the electric power industry needs to invest between $1.5 trillion and $2 trillion in new
generating capacity and infrastructure, while the largest of the U.S. electronic companies has a value of
approximately $36 billion and most of the rest is much smaller.
2 The case where contenders’ payments can never exceed their budget constraints have been considered by
Maskin [3] and Pai and Vohra [6]. Pai and Vohra use that model to consider revenue-maximizing mechanisms.
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constraint would be a non-issue. Furthermore, various means to finance bids may change
the likelihood of default. Default also causes external costs such as delaying the project that
policy makers are anxious to launch.
The effect of default has been considered by Waehrer [8] in a model where bidders
have no budget constraint. With a model combining the features of Che and Gale and
Waehrer, Zheng [9] demonstrates that, depending on whether loans available to bidders
are sufficiently cheap or not, a first-price auction is won either by the poorest bidder who
defaults most likely or by a rich bidder who defaults least likely. In that paper, bidders are
assumed to have the same valuation of the item being auctioned. Removing this assumption,
Board [1] considers a model where bidders are different in both valuations and wealth and he
analyzes effects of default risks on first- and second-price auctions. Incorporating a capital
market into an auction model similar in spirit to those of Board and Zheng, Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan [7] investigate the relationship between a first-price auction and various
financing methods. They demonstrate that both debt and equity financing, as well as a more
general state-contingent financing, can implement the efficient allocation with the proviso
that the terms of the financing are determined based on the winner’s bid and wealth.3
The efficiency result of Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, while interesting, has its lim-
itations. In their model, the external cost of default is never counted, hence default merely
means that the winner transfers the realized return of the project to others without inter-
rupting the project at all. Thus, their efficient mechanism is not really efficient when we take
into account the possibility that default generates an external cost such as disrupting the
project.4 In terms of the possibility of implementing the efficient allocation, their efficiency
result does not distinguish between equity and debt financing. In addition, they have made
some restrictive assumptions.5
3 In addition, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan also consider the case of “pre-auction financing,” where the
terms of the financing are independent of the winner’s bid. Those considerations are based on the assumption
that the winner’s valuation is known to the capital market.
4 In their model, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan assume that the value of the project is always positive.
Thus, for their mechanism to be efficient, either default does not disrupt the project at all, or default should
never occur (while default does occur in their equilibrium).
5 Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan consider almost only the case where every bidder-type must bid above
their wealth, an assumption that they needed to carry out the analysis with calculus. (See Zheng [9] for
the subtleties when a bidder need not bid above its budget.) The only exception is their Proposition 9,
which deals with the case where some bidder-types do not need to borrow, but its proof is unclear to me.
3
In this note, I shall consider the efficient mechanism design problem where bidders
are different in their valuations, wealth, and limited liabilities. Default means the complete
uselessness of the project, so default is socially desirable only if the the realized net return
of the project is negative. Theorem 1 says that it is impossible to implement full efficiency
via debt financing and Theorem 2 sayst that full efficiency can always be implemented via a
modified Vickrey auction that offers a certain equity financing to the winner.
The idea of my efficiency result is that equity financing shrinks the range of a bidder’s
valuation down to the level that the bidder can afford, thereby removing its budget constraint.
This idea cannot be applied to a usual auction environment where the object being auctioned
is indivisible and cannot be shared. But in the context of a firm running a project, its
ownership is typically divisible. In fact, this efficiency result sheds a new light on the
prevalence of equity corporate ownership and the frequent phenomena that economies heavily
in debt are prone to default crises.
In §6, the model is extended to incorporate the moral hazard problem of the winning
contender. Then it is impossible to achieve full efficiency (Corollary 1). Like risky-debt
financing, equity financing undermines the winning contender’s incentive to exert efforts
that could have improved the actual value of the project. With effort inefficiently exerted,
default occurs more often.
2 The Primitives
A project is to be run by one of n contenders. At the beginning, each contender i privately
knows a signal θi ∈ Θi, its wealth wi ∈ R+, and its limited liability λi ∈ R++, so a bidder-
type is (θi, wi, λi). The value of the project depends on who runs it and a random variable z.
If the realized value of z is z and contender i completes the project, the ex post value of the
project is equal to a real number vi(θi, z). If the project is incomplete, its value is zero. Let
wi and λi denote the infimums of the supports for wi and λi, respectively.
For example, in calculating the present value of a bidder’s payment in the case where the bidder does not
default, the authors did not include the bidder’s payment in the event where the project results in low value
(line -7, page 810). The argument for the case ci + L is less than the cash bid is also unclear.
To establish their efficiency result, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan also assume that a bidder cannot
lie about its available cash. They need this assumption to reduce the bidder-type into a one-dimensional
variable so as to calculate the equilibrium.
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Before any contender launches the project, the variable z remains uncertain and each
contender i may receive a loan δi ∈ R+ and may deliver an interim payment pi. The interim
payment needs to satisfy its budget constraint
pi ≤ wi + δi. (1)
If a contender i promises an interim payment that violates its budget constraint, the payment
cannot be delivered and i gets zero payoff for the entire game.
If a contender i receives a loan, i.e., δi > 0, i promises to pay ∆ later or pays a default
penalty ψi if i defaults on the debt. Including interest payment, ∆ needs to satisfy
∆i ≥ δi. (2)
The default penalty needs to satisfy the limited liability constraint
ψi ≤ λi. (3)
Any contender i who borrows a loan is subject to an audit so that if it misrepresents its
limited liability as a higher number than λi then it receives no loan at all. Hence (3) can
always be satisfied.
If a contender i is selected as the winner, i signs a contract specified by an equity share
αi ∈ (0, 1] which results from the selection and negotiation process. If it completes the
project, the winner receives a fraction αi of the ex post value of the project.
The winner i launches the project and discovers the realized value z. Then i chooses
whether to default or not. If it does not default, i completes the project, receives its share
αivi(θi, z) of the value of the project, and pays off its debt ∆i. If i defaults, the project is
incomplete (hence of zero value to the society), i pays the default penalty ψi and makes no
other payment, thereby walking away from its debt ∆i.
A social choice function (SCF) is a mapping that associates to each bidder-type profile
(θi, wi, λi)
n
i=1 two objects: (i) a lottery that selects a winner out of the contenders and (ii) a
default decision rule that maps any possible realized value z of the random variable to either
default or not default.
An SCF is efficient if and only if, for any bidder-type profile (θi, wi, λi)
n
i=1,
a. the project is won by the contender i∗ that maximizes the expected (social) value
E [max{vi(θi, z), 0}]
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of the project across all contenders i with random variable z, and
b. if contender i wins, for any realized value z of z, default occurs if and only if vi(θi, z) < 0.
3 Mechanisms
Clearly the revelation principle holds in this environment. Let us therefore restrict attention
to direct revelation mechanisms. Thus, a mechanism is an SCF, defined previously, coupled
with a payment and financing scheme. To each bidder-type profile (θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1, this scheme
associates a lottery that determines every contender i’s interim payment pi, debt and its
payment scheme (δi,∆i), default penalty ψi, and, in the event that i is the winner, i’s
share αi of the value of the project. For the scheme to be feasible, every realized vector
(pi, δi,∆i, ψi) needs to satisfy the financial constraints (1)–(3).
Let us arbitrarily pick any mechanism and focus our attention to it. For any bidder-type
profile (θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1 and any realized z, denote the following aspects of the mechanism:
• qi((θj, wj, λj)nj=1) := the probability with which contender i wins
• αi((θj, wj, λj)nj=1) := i’s share of the value of the project if i is the winner
• pi((θj, wj, λj)nj=1) := i’s interim payment
• δi((θj, wj, λj)nj=1) := the loan provided to i
• ∆i((θj, wj, λj)nj=1) := the principal and interest payments by i if i does not default
• ψi((θj, wj, λj)nj=1, z) := the default penalty for i when the realized value of z is z.
The financial constraints (1)–(3) mean that for every (θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1
pi((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1) ≤ wi + δi((θj, wj, λj)nj=1), (4)
δi((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1) ≤ ∆i((θj, wj, λj)nj=1), (5)
ψi((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1, z) ≤ λi. (6)
If αi((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1) = 1 for any contender i and any bidder-type profile (θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1,
the mechanism is using only debt-financing . If ∆i((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1) > ψi((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1, z)
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for some contender i and a positive-measure set of bidder-type profiles (θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1, the
mechanism is engaged in risky-debt financing , with
∆i((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1)− ψi((θj, wj, λj)nj=1, z)
being the quantity of the risky debt, as a borrower i may want to default on a debt which
exceeds the default penalty. If ∆i((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1) = ψi((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1, z) for any i, any
(θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1 and any z, the mechanism is using equity-financing , with the debt risk-free.
Let (θˆi, wˆi, λˆi) denote the type reported by contender i, who expects others to be
truthful. If i is the winner and if the realized value of z is z, i’s default decision is clearly to
default if and only if
αi(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θ−i, w−i, λ−i)vi(θi, z)−∆i(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θ−i, w−i, λ−i) < −ψi(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θ−i, w−i, λ−i; z). (7)
Thus, if a contender i is the winner, its ex post payoff is equal to
uWi (θˆi, wˆi, λˆi; θi; θ−i, w−i, λ−i; z)
:= max
 αi(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θ−i, w−i, λ−i)vi(θi, z)−∆i(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θ−i, w−i, λ−i),−ψi(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θ−i, w−i, λ−i; z)
 . (8)
Thus, during the selection process, for any contender i with type (θi, wi, λi), i’s expected
payoff ui(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi; θi, wi, λi) from reporting (θˆi, wˆi, λˆi) is equal to
ui(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi; θi, wi, λi)
= E
[
qi(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θ−i, w−i, λ−i)uWi (θˆi, wˆi, λˆi; θi; θ−i, w−i, λ−i; z)− pi(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θ−i, w−i, λ−i)
]
if the budget and liability constraints (4)–(6) are satisfied and ui(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi; θi, wi, λi) = 0
if (4)–(6) are not satisfied. The incentive compatibility condition is that for each contender i
and for any type (θi, wi, λi),
ui(θi, wi, λi; θi, wi, λi) = max
(θˆi,wˆi,λˆi)
ui(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θi, wi, λi).
Coupled with the participation constraint
ui(θi, wi, λi; θi, wi, λi) ≥ 0, (9)
the incentive compatibility condition becomes
ui(θi, wi, λi; θi, wi, λi) = max(θˆi,wˆi,λˆi) ui(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θi, wi, λi) (10)
s.t.
 wˆi ≤ wiλˆi ≤ λi (11)
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That is because over-reporting one’s wealth or liability can never make the contender better-
off than reporting them truthfully, as by our assumption a contender gets zero payoff if it
violates its budget constraint or if it is found over-reporting its liability.
A mechanism is (ex post) efficient if and only if it implements the efficient SCF. In
other words, an efficient mechanism satisfies the budget constraint (4), limited liability con-
straint (6), incentive compatibility (10) and participation constraint (9), and the SCF of the
mechanism is efficient. By condition (b) of efficient SCF, in any efficient mechanism, for any
contender i who becomes the winner, (7) holds if and only if vi(θi, z) < 0.
As we are discussing in the context of financially constraints, it is reasonable to assume
that the social planner is itself subject to some budget constraint so that it cannot be overly
generous in subsidizing the contenders. Specifically, we consider only those mechanisms that
give zero surplus to any bidder-type which at the efficient SCF generates zero social surplus.
I.e., with Ui(θi, wi, λi) denoting the right-hand side of (10), for any contender i and any
bidder-type (θi, wi, λi),
Emax{vi(θi, z), 0} < max
j 6=i
Emax{vj(θj, z), 0} a.e. θ−i =⇒ Ui(θi, wi, λi) = 0. (12)
The “if” clause of (12) means that a bidder with type (θi, wi, λi) would never win the project
if the efficient SCF is implemented. If the “then” clause of (12) is not satisfied, then such
a bidder-type gets a positive surplus (nonnegative due to the participation constraint) even
though it has no chance to contribute any social surplus. This positive surplus has to be
subsidized by the social planner, because we assume that a contender has no other source of
income. Clearly it is wasteful for the social planner to subsidize such a bidder-type at all.
We may call (12) no free lunch constraint.
4 The Inefficiency of Debt Financing
A purely debt-financing mechanism means the share αi((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1) = 1 for any con-
tender i in case that i wins. With any winner owning the entire return of the project, debt is
the only channel for a contender to make up the difference between its wealth and payment.
It is impossible for a purely debt-financing mechanism to achieve efficiency fully. That
is because a debt larger than a winning contender’s liability would induce the winner to
default more often than the efficiency level, and a debt less than a contender’s liability may
constrain its ability to win even when it is the most capable contender to run the project.
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To state the impossibility theorem, we define two notations:
νi := Emax{vi(θi, z), 0} (13)
(νi, νi) :=
(
inf
θi∈Θi
Emax{vi(θi, z), 0}, sup
θi∈Θi
Emax{vi(θi, z), 0}
)
.
As long as the default decision is aligned with efficiency, νi plays the role of contender i’s
private value before the winner launches the project. The theorem uses an assumption, (14)
in the following, which says that the range of every contender’s possible private values is
sufficiently large compared to the contender’s lowest possible wealth and liability.
Theorem 1 Assume: for any contender i,
E
[(
max
j 6=i
νj
)
1maxj 6=i νj≤νi
]
> wi + λi. (14)
For any mechanism (qi, αi, pi, δi,∆i, ψi)
n
i=1, if αi((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1) = 1 for any contender i and
any bidder-type profile (θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1, then the mechanism is not efficient.
Proof By definition of efficiency, we need only to show that there exist a positive-measure
set of bidder-type profiles and a positive-measure set of realized values of z at which the
equilibrium outcome of the mechanism is not efficient.
As efficiency requires that the default decision of any winner i be efficient, (7) holds if
and only if vi(θi, z) < 0. Since in this mechanism αi((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1) = 1 for any i and any
bidder-type profile, the condition of efficient default becomes, for any ((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1), z),
vi(θi, z)−∆i((θj, wj, λj)nj=1)) < ψi((θj, wj, λj)nj=1), z)⇔ vi(θi, z) < 0,
hence
∆i((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1)) = ψi((θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1), z)
(6)
≤ λi
for any contender i and any bidder-type profile (θj, wj, λj)
n
j=1).
It follows from the budget constraint (4) and debt constraint (5) of the mechanism
that every contender i’s interim payment has to be always bounded from above by wi + λi.
Now pick a contender i such that νi ≤ νj for all contenders j. If the mechanism achieves
the efficient SCF, then the project is always won by the contender with the highest νj∗ among
all contenders j. Fix contender i’s wealth and liability at (wi, λi) and follow the standard
“envelope theorem” routine along the dimension of νi. The incentive compatibility of the
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efficient SCF implies that, when i’s type is such that νi = νi, the expected amount of i’s
interim payment is equal to
E
[(
max
j 6=i
νj
)
1maxj 6=i νj≤νi
]
− Ui(θi, wi, λi),
where θi is an arbitrarily chosen element of {θi ∈ Θi : Evi(θi, z) = νi}. By the budget
constraint derived above, we have
E
[(
max
j 6=i
νj
)
1maxj 6=i νj≤νi
]
− Ui(θi, wi, λi) ≤ wi + λi.
By the choice of i and θi, νi < maxj 6=i νj for sure, hence condition (12) implies that
Ui(θi, wi, λi) = 0. Thus, E
[
(maxj 6=i νj)1maxj 6=i νj≤νi
] ≤ wi+λi, which contradicts (14). Hence
the incentive compatibility condition for contender i is violated when its type is (θi, wi, λi)
such that νi = νi. By continuity of the surplus function (which would follow from incentive
compatibility), this violation holds for a positive-measure set of i’s types.
5 Implementing Efficiency through Equity Financing
By contrast, efficiency can be implemented by a mechanism with equity financing. The idea is
to choose the winner based on who can bring the highest expected value to the project and to
give the winner a sufficiently small equity share thereby shrinking the range of a contender’s
possible values down to what its budget constraint allows. A contender’s incentive of being
truthful about its valuation of the project is not affected by the equity share, as the share is
designed to be independent of the report of its valuation. And a contender has no incentive
to under-report its wealth and liability, because the lower the sum of the two, the smaller
its equity share in the event that the contender wins.
Theorem 2 Assume for every contender i, νi < ∞, νi is a constant identical across all i,
and the prior distribution has zero mass at νi. There exists a mechanism, using equity financ-
ing, that implements the efficient SCF. In this mechanism, given the profile (θˆi, wˆi, λˆi)
n
i=1 of
reported bidder-types,
a. the winner belongs to argmaxi=1,...,nEvi(θˆi, z),
b. if contender i is the winner then i shares
αi(wˆi, λˆi) :=
wˆi + λˆi
νi
(15)
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of the ex post value of the project if it is completed, and
c. if contender i is not the winner, i’s interim payment is zero; if i is the winner, i’s
interim payment is equal to
pi
(
θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θˆ−i, wˆ−i, λˆ−i
)
:= αi(wˆi, λˆi)max
j 6=i
Evj(θˆj, z), (16)
with default penalty, for any possible realized value z,
ψi((θˆi, wˆi, λˆi)
n
i=1, z) := ∆i((θˆi, wˆi, λˆi)
n
i=1) (17)
:= δi((θˆi, wˆi, λˆi)
n
i=1)
:= max{pi(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi)ni=1)− wˆi, 0}.
Proof If the mechanism described above is incentive compatible, then any winner’s default
decision is aligned with the efficient SCF. That is because, by (17), the winner i’s optimal
decision is to default if and only if (7) holds. With the share αi(wi, λi) positive, this condition
becomes αi(wi, λi)vi(θi, z) < 0, i.e., the efficient default condition vi(θi, z) < 0.
Next, we verify that the mechanism satisfies the budget and limited liabilities con-
straints. By (16) and provision (a) of the theorem, for any contender i,
pi
(
θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θˆ−i, wˆ−i, λˆ−i
)
=
(
αi(wˆi, λˆi)max
j 6=i
νˆj
)(
1maxj 6=i νˆj<νˆi
) ≤ wˆi + λˆi
νi
νi = wˆi + λˆi.
(18)
If pi
(
θˆi, wˆi, λˆi, θˆ−i, wˆ−i, λˆ−i
)
> wˆi, then by (17) we have
ψi((θˆi, wˆi, λˆi)
n
i=1, z) = δi((θˆi, wˆi, λˆi)
n
i=1) = pi(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi)
n
i=1)− wˆi
(18)
≤ λˆi,
where the second equality implies the budget constraint (4) and the last inequality implies
the liability constraint (6).
Note that the mechanism satisfies the participation constraint (9), as every contender i
can report its value to be the infimum νi of the support thereby securing zero payoff.
Finally, we verify that incentive compatibility. Recall νi defined by (13). Define
qi(νi) := Prob
{
θ−i : max
j 6=i
νj < νi
}
Pi(νi) := E
[
pi(θi, wi, λi, θ−i, w−i, λ−i)
αi(wi, λi)
]
(16)
= E
[(
max
j 6=i
νj
)(
1maxj 6=i νj<νi
)]
.
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Clearly qi is a weakly increasing function and, through integration by parts,
qi(νi)νi − Pi(νi) =
∫ νi
νi
qi(ν
′
i)dν
′
i. (19)
For any contender i and any bidder-type (θi, wi, λi), with νi = Emax{vi(θi, z), 0},
consider the deviation of misrepresenting i’s type as another bidder-type (θˆi, wˆi, λˆi), with
νˆi = Emax{vi(θˆi, z), 0}. Without loss of generality, assume that the expected payoff from
such misrepresentation is nonnegative (otherwise i could have reported νi), i.e.,
qi(νˆi)νi − P (νˆi) ≥ 0. (20)
Let us calculate the difference between contender i’s expected payoff from truthtelling and
that from reporting (θˆi, wˆi, λˆi), suppressing the subscript i:
α(w, λ) (q(ν)ν − P (ν))− α(wˆ, λˆ) (q(νˆ)ν − P (νˆ))
(15)
=
w + λ
ν
(q(ν)ν − P (ν))− wˆ + λˆ
ν
(q(νˆ)ν − P (νˆ))
(11),(20)
≥ wˆ + λˆ
ν
((q(ν)ν − P (ν))− (q(νˆ)ν − P (νˆ)))
=
wˆ + λˆ
ν
((q(ν)ν − P (ν))− (q(νˆ)νˆ − P (νˆ)) + q(νˆ)νˆ − q(νˆ)ν)
(19)
=
wˆ + λˆ
ν
(∫ ν
νˆ
q(ν ′)dν ′ + q(νˆ)(νˆ − ν)
)
=
wˆ + λˆ
ν
(∫ ν
νˆ
(q(ν ′)− q(νˆ))dν ′
)
≥ 0 by monotonicity of q.
It follows that the contender cannot profit from misrepresenting its type.
The mechanism designed in Theorem 2 has an intuitive interpretation: Every con-
tender i reports its wealth wi and liability λi to the financial sector and then obtains—
i. an equity guarantee which promises, in the event that contender i wins the project, to
pay 1− (wi+λi)/νi of the price for the license to run the project, in return for owning
1− (wi + λi)/νi of the actual profit of the project unless default occurs, and
ii. loan guarantee which promises, in the event that contender i wins the project, to lend
contender i the amount by which i’s interim payment ((wi+λi)/νi of the price for the
license of the project) exceeds i’s wealth, with the amount of this lending being the
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default penalty in the event that i defaults on the loan. (A winner’s interim payment
is shrunk by the equity share (wi+λi)/νi down below wi+λi, so this debt is risk-free:
it never exceeds the winner’s liability.)
Then the contenders compete for the right to run the project via a Vickrey auction.
Even without the loan guarantee provision, the efficient SCF can still be implemented.
We just need to modify the share function (15) into αi(wi, λi) := wi/νi, completely not
taking advantage of a contender’s liability λi. By contrast, the equity guarantee provision is
indispensable, as Theorem 1 has demonstrated.
6 The Case with Moral Hazard
A possible drawback of equity financing is the moral hazard problem in the case where the
ex post value of the project depends upon the hidden effort of the winner who runs it. Let
us extend our model to incorporate that case. In the sequel, assume that the ex post value
of the project, if completed, is equal to
vi(θi, e, z)
if contender i with type θi runs it with an effort e, which is an element of an interval E ⊆ R,
and realized state z. Assume that the cost bourn by contender i due to effort e is equal to
ci(e), also unobservable to others.
In the sequel, we make the following assumptions for any contender i.
a. For any θi ∈ Θi and any effort level e ∈ E, vi(θi, e, ·) is continuously differentiable with
derivative D3vi(θi, e, ·) > 0 over the range of z, and vi(θi, e, z) < 0 < vi(θi, e, z).
b. ci is continuously differentiable and is convex on R++.
c. For any θi ∈ Θi, and any realized state z, vi(θi, ·, z) is continuously differentiable with
derivative D2vi(θi, ·, z) > 0 overall the domain of e.
Let us focus on an arbitrarily chosen incentive feasible mechanism (αi, qi, pi, δi,∆i, ψi)
n
i=1.
First, consider a contender i’s default decision in the event that it has won the project
with a financing package (αi, δi,∆i, ψi) (which may depend on the messages submitted by
the contenders) and has exerted effort level e. Given any realized state z, i’s payoff from not
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defaulting is equal to αivi(θi, e, z)−∆i and its payoff from default is equal to −ψi. Thus, i’s
optimal default decision is to default if and only if the realized state z is below a cutoff z∗i ,
where z∗i is the solution for the equation
vi(θi, e, z
∗
i ) =
∆i − ψi
αi
. (21)
The existence and uniqueness of z∗i are guaranteed by the above assumption (a) and the
incentive feasibility of the mechanism under consideration.
Lemma 1 The default cutoff z∗i given by Eq. (21) is an increasing function of
∆i−ψi
αi
. Fur-
thermore, z∗i is a differentiable function of αi and
γi := ∆i − ψi, (22)
and
∂
∂αi
z∗i = −
γi
α2iD3vi(θi, e, z
∗
i )
(23)
∂
∂γi
z∗i =
1
αiD3vi(θi, e, z∗i )
, (24)
where D3 denotes the partial derivative operator for the third argument of a function.
Proof The monotonicity claim follows directly from Assumption (a) of the function vi(θi, e, ·).
That assumption also says that the partial derivative of vi with respect to z
∗
i is always
nonzero. Hence the implicit function theorem implies that z∗i is locally a differentiable
function of αi and γi. Differentiating Eq. (21) with respect to z
∗
i and αi, we get (23);
differentiating (21) with respect to z∗i and γi, we obtain (24).
The amount γi
αi
is the quantity of risky debt per equity share. Lemma 1 implies that
a larger per-equity-share risky debt results in a higher probability for the winner to default.
Call this the default-exacerbating effect .
Second, consider contender i’s decision on the effort level after it has won the project,
given the financing package (αi, δi,∆i, ψi), and before the state z is revealed.
max
e∈R++
{−ci(e) + E [max {αivi(θi, e, z)−∆i,−ψi}]}
(22)
= −ψi + max
e∈R++
{
−ci(e) + αiE
[
max
{
vi(θi, e, z)− γi
αi
, 0
}]}
= −ψi + max
e∈R++
{
−ci(e) + αi
∫ z
z∗i
(
vi(θi, e, z)− γi
αi
)
dµ(z)
}
. (25)
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The first-order condition for problem (25) is
c′i(e)
αi
=
∫ z
z∗i
D2vi(θi, e, z)dµ(z), (26)
where Eq. (21) has been used. Assume that c′′i is sufficiently larger than
∂2
∂e2
vi for the second-
order condition to be satisfied. Solving the simultaneous equations (21) and (26), we obtain
the unique optimal effort level e∗i and optimal default cutoff z
∗
i for contender i.
Plugging the solutions for z∗i and e
∗
i into (25), we derive the expression for contender i’s
optimal expected payoff from running the project given financing package (αi, di, ψi):
− ψi−ci(e∗i ) + αi
∫ z
z∗i
(
vi(θi, e
∗
i , z)−
γi
αi
)
dµ(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Vi(θi,αi,γi,ψi)
= −ψi + Vi(θi, αi, γi, ψi). (27)
Thus, a contender i’s expected payoff in the mechanism is equal to
ui(θˆi, wˆi, λˆi; θi) = Eθ−i,w−i,λ−i [qiVi(θi, αi, γi, ψi)− (qiψi +min{pi, wˆi})] , (28)
where qi, αi, γi, ψi, pi depend only on i’s message (θˆi, wˆi, λˆi) and the other contenders’ presum-
ably truthful messages (θ−i, w−i, λ−i). The incentive feasibility condition for the mechanism
is that (θi, wi, λi) maximizes ui(·, ·, ·, θi) subject to the constraints that wˆi ≤ wi and λˆi ≤ λi.
The expected payoff function in (28) differs from the usual quasilinear form in auction
theory in that the part for payment, qiψi+min{pi, wˆi}, is bounded from above by λi+wi due
to the budget and liability constraints (4)–(6). That is an obstacle to finding the contender
with the highest Vi to be the winner of the project.
The expected value of the social welfare generated by the mechanism is equal to
E
[
n∑
i=1
qi(θ, w, λ)
∫ z
z∗i
vi(θi, e
∗
i , z)dµ(z)
]
, (29)
where z∗i and e
∗
i are given by Eqs. (21) and (26).
Achieving full efficiency, i.e., maximizing (29) without binding the constraints of in-
centive, budget and liability, would require achieving not only default efficiency and winner-
selection efficiency, defined in §2, but also effort efficiency, i.e., any winner i’s effort level e∗∗i
solves problem (25) with the restriction that αi = 1 and γi = 0 always.
Corollary 1 In the extended model with moral hazard, denote
ν˜i := Emax{vi(θi, e∗∗i , z), 0} − ci(e∗∗i )
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and ν˜i for the supremum of the range of the random variable ν˜i. Assume: for any contender i,
E
[(
max
j 6=i
ν˜j
)
1maxj 6=i ν˜j≤ν˜i
]
> wi + λi. (30)
Then there does not exist a feasible mechanism that implements efficiency almost surely.
Proof As in the proof of Theorem 1, default efficiency implies that every contender i is
subject to the hard budget constraint wi + λi. By the requirement of effort efficiency, every
i’s equity share αi = 1 always. Then the same envelope theorem routine used in the proof
of Theorem 1, with (14) replaced by (30) here, implies the impossibility claim.
The dilemma for the social planner is: on one hand, selection efficiency would require
that the contenders’ budget constraints be sufficiently relaxed via equity or risky debt fi-
nancing; on the other hand, each of these instruments may compromise default or effort
efficiency. Now that they are unavoidable to achieve selection efficiency, which financing
instrument is less detrimental to default, effort, and winner-selection efficiency? Presented
below are some heuristic comparative statics potentially useful for further analysis.
First we compare the effects of the two instruments in relaxing contenders’ budget
constraints. Inspecting (27)–(28), we see that both financing instruments are to shrink
the range a contender’s expected payoff Vi(θi, αi, di, ψi) from winning. With Vi shrunk,
the interim payment a contender i needs to deliver in order to signal the value of Vi also
shrinks thereby partially relaxing the budget constraint. To calculate the budget-relaxing
effect, let us calculate the partial derivative ∂
∂θi
Vi by applying the envelope theorem to the
maximization problem (25) and the definition of Vi in (27):
∂
∂θi
Vi(θi, αi, γi, ψi) = αi
∫ z
z∗i (θi)
D1vi(θi, e
∗
i (θi), z)dµ(z),
whereD1 denotes the derivative operator of the function vi(·, ei, z) and (z∗i (θi), e∗i (θi)) signifies
the dependence of (z∗i , e
∗
i ) on θi via Eqs. (21) and (26). With the envelope theorem applied
to the incentive compatibility of a contender whose expected payoff function is given by (28),
the expected interim payment made by a type-(θi, wi, λi) contender i is equal to
αi
∫ θi
θi
Eθ−i,w−i,λ−i
[
qi(θ
′
i, wi, λi; θ−i, w−i, λ−i)
∫ z
z∗i (θ
′
i)
D1vi(θ
′
i, e
∗
i (θ
′
i), z)dµ(z)
]
dθ′i
−Ui(θi, wi, λi). (31)
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With the assumption that vi is strictly increasing in θi, D1vi(θ
′
i, e
∗
i (θ
′
i), z) > 0 always, hence
Lemma 1 implies that a global increase of γi
αi
(for all θ′i) reduces∫ z
z∗i (θ
′
i)
D1vi(θ
′
i, e
∗
i (θ
′
i), z)dµ(z)
thereby reducing the expected interim payment (31) and hence partially relaxing i’s budget
constraint of wi + λi.
Thus, both equity financing and risky-debt financing have the effect of partially relaxing
the budget constraint through enlarging the quantity γi
αi
globally. However, equity financing
has an additional effect on relaxing budget constraints because αi is a coefficient of the entire
integral in the expression (31) thereby scaling down the expected payment. Moreover, this
effect of αi does not require αi to scale down globally.
Second, we compare the effects of the two financing instruments in default and effort.
For the maximization problem (25), a second-order condition is
c′′i (e)
αi
>
∫ zi
z∗i
D22vi(θi, e, z)dµ(z). (32)
As long as (32) holds, the first-order condition (26) is sufficient and necessary, the winner i’s
optimal effort level e∗i is the intersection between its marginal benefit
∫ zi
z∗i
D2vi(θi, e, z)dµ(z)
and its per-share marginal cost c′i(e)/αi.
Lemma 2 If (32) always holds, then any winner i’s optimal effort e∗i is a differentiable
function of the equity share αi and risky debt quantity γi, and
αi · ∂
∂αi
e∗i + γi ·
∂
∂γi
e∗i =
c′i(e
∗
i )
c′′i (e
∗
i )− αi
∫ zi
z∗i
D22vi(θi, e
∗
i , z)dµ(z)
. (33)
Proof As (32) always holds, the first-order condition for the maximization problem (25)
is sufficient and necessary, hence a winner i’s optimal effort level e∗i is equal to the solution
for e in Eq. (26). By the implicit function theorem (whose nonsingularity condition follows
from (32), e∗i is locally a differentiable function of (αi, γi), and we can obtain the partial
derivatives by totally differentiating Eq. (26) and plugging in Eqs. (23)–(24).
∂
∂αi
e∗i =
(γi/αi)µ
′
(z
∗
i )D2vi(θi, e
∗
i , z
∗
i )
∂
∂γi
z∗i + c
′
i(e
∗
i )/α
2
i
c′′i (e
∗
i )/αi −
∫ zi
z∗i
D22vi(θi, e
∗
i , z)dµ(z)
, (34)
∂
∂γi
e∗i = −
µ′(z
∗
i )D2vi(θi, e
∗
i , z
∗
i )
∂
∂γi
z∗i
c′′i (e
∗
i )/αi −
∫ zi
z∗i
D22vi(θi, e
∗
i , z)dµ(z)
. (35)
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Plugging (35) into (34), we obtain
∂
∂αi
e∗i = −
γi
αi
· ∂
∂γi
e∗i +
c′i(e
∗
i )/αi
c′′i (e
∗
i )− αi
∫ zi
z∗i
D22vi(θi, e
∗
i , z)dµ(z)
, (36)
which simplifies to (36).
By (35), ∂
∂γi
e∗i < 0. Thus, Eq. (36) implies that∣∣∣∣ ∂∂αi e∗i
∣∣∣∣ = γiαi
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂γi e∗i
∣∣∣∣+ c′i(e∗i )/αi
c′′i (e
∗
i )− αi
∫ zi
z∗i
D22vi(θi, e
∗
i , z)dµ(z)
.
Hence
∣∣∣ ∂∂αi e∗i ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣ ∂∂γi e∗i ∣∣∣ if γi/αi ≥ 1.
Lemma 2 can be illustrated heuristically with Figure 1. In that figure, the curve MC
depicts the left-hand side, and the curve MB the right-hand side, of Eq. (26) as a function
of e.6 The optimal effort level e∗i is the intersection between the two curves. For a higher
γi
αi
,
Lemma 1 implies that z∗i is higher and then the right-hand side of Eq. (26) is smaller, meaning
the curve MB shifts downward to the dashed curve MB′. For a smaller αi, the left-hand
side of Eq. (26) is scaled up, meaning that the curve MC pivots upward to the dashed MC ′.
effort
e∗ie′i e
′′
ie
′′′
i
MB
MC
MC ′
MB′
Figure 1: A larger quantity of risky debt shifts curve MB down to MB′. A smaller equity
share shifts down MB and pivots curve MC up to MC ′.
Thus, if the risky debt γi is larger while equity share αi is unchanged, curve MB
6 Note that the marginal benefit is not necessarily decreasing in the effort level unless the D22vi(θi, e, z)
is sufficiently negative. This observation uses the fact that z∗i is decreasing in e and the assumption that
vi(θi, e, z) is increasing in e.
18
shifts down ward and the optimal effort decreases from e∗i to e
′′
i in the figure. Such default
exacerbation is the only effect of risky debt financing on the winner’s effort.
The effect of equity share, by contrast, is two-fold. First, it has the default-exacerbating
effect as risky debt does, as a smaller αi amounts to a bigger
γi
αi
and hence curve MB shifts
downward to MB′. Second, equity share has another effect that risky debt does not have.
Scaling down αi amounts to raising the per-share marginal cost c
′
i(e)/αi of one’s effort,
which means the curve MC pivots upward to MC ′. Thus, a smaller equity share reduces
the winner’s optimal effort level from e∗i to e
′′′
i , more detrimental than increasing risky debt.
In sum, equity and risky-debt financing have similar effects on relaxing contenders’
budget constraints, exacerbating default, and discouraging efforts. However, the local anal-
ysis presented above indicate that the effects of equity financing might be stronger than
those of risky-debt financing, be it the positive effect or negative effect. If they are both
applied globally for all types, equity financing relaxes budget constraints more than risky
debt does. If the second-order condition (32) holds, equity financing exacerbates default and
discourages efforts more than risky-debt financing does.
7 Discussion
This note is a beginning attempt to introduce finance into the theory of auction design.
From a social planner’s viewpoint, the role of auctions is essential in making financing an
issue. If every contender is assigned a project to manage, then it is not an issue at all to
select the most capable contender to run the project, so there is no need for them to signal
their capabilities through bids, so it would be unnecessary to finance them.
The theorems reported in this paper demonstrate that, in the case where moral hazard
is a non-issue for the winner of the project, equity and debt financing are distinct in their
roles of achieving efficiency. While no mechanism relying only on debt financing can achieve
efficiency fully, there exists a mechanism with equity financing that achieves efficiency fully.
The default-prone nature of risky debt financing is the driving force of this distinction.
In the case where the winner of the project has a moral hazard problem, it is impossible
to achieve efficiency fully. In this paper, we observe that, while equity and risky-debt financ-
ing both lead to less effort and more default, the two instruments differ in the magnitudes
of their effects, with those of equity financing stronger. It remains an open question how the
19
socially optimal mechanism looks like and whether there is an efficiency-ranking between
debt and equity financing.
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